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1. The Context
The survival of all participants in the inteinational arena rests
upon the maintenance, short of actual and viable disarmament, of a sys-
tem of effective mutual deterrence among the major participants. This
system-is based on the capability of each major participant to inflict
an intolerable degree of destruction upon any other who might strike
first with nuclear weapons. Given such a capability at present and
for the foreseeable future, effective mutual deterrence in turn depends
upon the major participants' adequate knowledge of their respective ca-
pabilities and intentions, sufficieut to reveal a relative balance and
thereby to decer a nuclear first strike by any of them.
Without such knowledge, a participant may come to expect that its
options are reduced to choosing between striking first or suffering de-
struction. Alternatively, a participant might consider that it could
gain strategic advantage by laurching a surprise, or preemptive, nu-
clear or other strike and emerge without sustaining intolerable damage.
Accordingly, the gathering and sharing of intelligence, or knowledge,
*Particular gratitude is due to Professors Myres S. McDougal and
W. Michael Reisman, both of the Yale Law School, for their valuable as-
sistance and criticism in the preparation of this manuscript and the ori-
ginal study from which it was drawn. For a more thorough treatment of
the intelligence function, particularly as it relates to basic consti-
tutive policies, see McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, "The Intelligence
Function and World Public Order", 46 Temp. L. Q. 365 (1973), and McDou-
gal, Lasswell, & Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of Authorita-
tive Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed. 253, 417-421 (1967); Reprinted in 1 The
Future of the International Legal Order 73 (C. Black & R. Falk, eds.,
1969).
concerning their respective security conditions is an essential and spe-
cialized function for each of the major participants if the system of re-
ciprocal deterrence is to continue to prevent the outbreak of large-scale
hostilities. Beyond the crucial need of the major partizipants for such
Intelligence, the security of other participants in the world social pro-
cess also rests on their ability to gather and share such information on
one another. The absence of such a capability might well preclude ra-
tional decision-making by participants in the face of an actual or ima-
gined crisis.
1Security, or the summation of all values, is an objective shared
by all participants in the world social process. it may be defined as
"high value expectancy, position, and potential: the realistic expec-
tancy cf maintaining influence." H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, Power and
Society 61 (1950). More specifically, it may consist of expertness (skill),
the successful prosecution or prevention of violence (power), the pos-
session of substantial resources (wealth), and the like, or any combina-
tion of these values. Whatever the value or values concerned, the term
"security" reflects a high likelihood of realization by a participant or
group of porticipants of that value or values, both at present and as
realistically projected into the future.
Security may be considered in terms of a spectrum consisting of
value expectations, position, and potential held with varying degrees
of intensity. The extremes may be classified as maximal and minimal
security. The former would thus reflect the fullest possible influence,
or expectancy, position, and potential, with respect to any value or
values, while the latter would represent the minimum, not the absence of
security, which would still qualify as realistic expectancy of exerting
Influence.
Influence is an interpersonal relation. As Lasswell & Kaplan ob-
serve: "this is true not merely because some values, such as the defer-
ence values, consist in such relations, but because the conduct of per-
sons active in the shaping and distribution of the value is essential to
its possession (enjoyment)." Id. at 60. As such, the interpersonal
shaping and acquisition of influence with respect to power among parti-
cipants is of vital concern in the context of the currently destnbilized
world social process. This is not meant to imply that power is in all
circumstances the most significant value. Rather, it is to recognize
that the exercise of influence, which consists of "affecting policies
of others than the self", id. at 71, in regard to power is essentlal
for the continued existence of participants, especially the major par-
ticipants, in the international arena.
The common interest of all participants in the international arena
i n at least minimal security 2 requires that intelligence be gathered and
made available to the major participants in sufficient quantity and quali-
ty to maintain the credibility of their second-strike capabilities. This
may in turn provide for the continued deterrence of hostilities between
them and may create, over tine, sufficient trust to permit the effective
prevention of such warfare by means of genuine disarmament.
Beyond this level of minimal security, the interests of all parti-
cipants in maximal security with respect to all values, or optimum pub-
lic order,3 favor greater inclusive participation4 in all phases of the
2McDougal, Lasswell, & Vlasic observe: "Unfortunately the most ur-
gent and fundamental problem facing mankind today is the securing of mi-
nimum public order. . .. It is in the interest of all to develop policies
which will decrease, if not completely and immediately remove, the ra-
pidly growing threat of comprehensive violence and-at the same time--
create conditions conducive to the fulfillment of the aspirations of men
everywhere for security and abundance in freedom." M. McDougal, H. Lass-
well, & I. Vlasic, lzw and Public Order in Space 157 (1963). A more de-
tailed statement of the basic policies of minimum order is made in M. Mc-
DougaL & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961).
3
"By optimum order we mean a public order which, beyond authori-
tative orientation toward the minimum of coercion and the maximum of
persuasion in the interactions of participants, is further designed
to promote the greatest production and the widest possible sharing of
human dignity values among the peoples." Id. at 160. The concept of
optimum order is developed in somewhat more detail in M. MLBougal &
Associates, Studies in World Public Order ch. 12 (1960).
4
"Inclusive public order interests" refer to "collective deci-
sions whose outcomes significantly affect the entire world arena or
large segments of it. . . ." Id. at 150, and which "therefore jus-
tify procedures that bring more thun a single nation-state into the
center of the process." Id. at 151.
security intelligence function. This is esential if maximal security,
reflecting the fullest possible influence, or expectancy, position, and
potential, in regard to all values, is to be achieved for all partici-
pants. However, in the absence of an effective world constitutive pro-
cess and in the context of the presently destabilized international arena,
such inclusive interests are challenged by exclusive5 and special 6 inte-
rests of a variety of different groups, especially functional and ter-
ritorial elites. Among the most typical and persistent demands for se-
curity intelligence based on exclusive and special interests are those
relating to the preservation of the integrity and efficacy of certain
territorial communities and to the effective power, wealth, and other
value positions of particular elite groups. Accommodation is required
on the basis of contextual analysis between inclusive and exclusive in-
terests, with the rejection of special interests.7
II. The Security Intelligence Function
The security intelligence function itself involves the collection,
processing, and distribution of information which is or may be relevant
5By "exclusive public order interests", McDougal, Lasswell, & Vla-
sic refer to decisions whose "impacts are of restricted scope that are
left to the determination of individual nation-states." Id. at 150.
They observe that:
Despite the urgency of obtaining at least minimum or-
der on a universal scale, we.do not, however, neglect
the many important exclusive interests that can appro-
priately be recognized within the all-embracing system
of public order, and which give reference to the uses
and competences exclusive to a nation-state (or a com-
ponent of a hypothetical unitary state that includes
all communities). . . hence the problem that arises
in the delimitation of exclusive interests is to iden-
tify uses whose incidence is relauively localized, and
waich further the common interest when left to local
competence.
Id. at 162-163.
6Special interests are defined as "interests incompatible with hu-
man dignity." Id. at 148.
7Az McDougal, Lasswell & Vlasic note:
to the participants who gather it. 8 It includes the collection of a
wide variety of information, ranging from the casual observations re-
ported by tourists returning from abroad to the highly sophisticated da-
ta gathered by reconnaissance satellites. There are no limits to the
types and sources of information which may be useful.
The processing of intelligence refers to the treatment accorded
the raw data which has been collected. It generally includes apprai-
sal of the relevance of the information, as well as doiting and cata-
loguing in forms useful to decision-makers. These tasks vary enormously
in complexity, depending in large measure on the amount and quality of
data requested and actually collected.
Distributing intelligence requires identifying who needs to know
what information for what purposes and forwarding such information ac-
cordingly. The satisfaction of such demands generally involves a com-
plex on-going process, as the needs of decision-makers for information
shift to meet the problems which confront them. Therefore, not only
the distribution effort but also the initial gathering and processing
tasks, must continuously react to these changes in decision-makers' re-
quirements for intelligence.
The product of the security intelligence function, the intelligence
itself, is defined in simplest form as dealing "with all the things which
should be kn iwn in advance of initiating a course of action." 9 More spe-
Inclusive and exclusive interests require accommo-
dation at every step, both between and within the two
broad categories. The basic challenge of accommoda-
tion is, while giving primacy to inclusive interests,
to insure the protection of exclusive interests with-
out giving inadvertant protection to interests that
are special and hence incompatible with common interests.
For the problems that arise in the accommodation pro-
cess a fundamental guideline is available, namely, the
principle of contextuality. By contextuality we refer
to the.consideration of every particular question in
the light of the overriding goals and characteristics
of the world communicy.
,d. at 165.
8 See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The Intelligence Function and
World Public Order," 46 Temp. L. Q. 365, 368-370 (1973).
9 United States Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Task Force on Intelligence Activities, Intelligence
Activities--A Report to the Congress 26 (1955).
cifically, it may be considered as "the product resulting from the col-
lection, evaluation, integration, and interpretation of all available
information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations
or areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially signi-
ficant to planning".1 0
In actual practice, the gathering and sharing of such intelligence
may have helped to deter the outbreak of nuclear or other large-scale
warfare among the major participants since the end of World War II. It
has not, however, encouraged significant progress beyond this minimal
objective.
A. Participants
Participation in the process of gathering, processing, and dissemina-
ting decurity intelligence is not representative of and responsible to
the widest possible range of imterests.11  It is, instead, concentrated
In the various agencies of government of nation-states and is largely
responsive to narrow national interests. While certain trends away
from this regime may be detected, this pattern remains dominant in the
context of the currently destabilized world order.
Participants may be considered in terms of two principal types:
governmental and non-governmental. The first, governmental, includes
both supranational and national governmental units. Supranational govern-
mental units involved in gathering, processing, and disseminating se-
curity intelligence include the Security Council, the General Assem-
bly, the Secretariat, and other bodies within the United Nations. Each
of these is frequently involved in the gathering and sharing of infor-
mation relevant to security conditions throughout the world.12
10Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, quo-
ted in id. at 26.
1 1 See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The Intelligence Function and
World Public Order, supra note 8, at 378-389.
1 2For instance, the Security Council receives regular reports from
United Nations Emergency Forces, as during the Congo, Sinai and Cyprus
crises, while the Secretary General receives a variety of intelligence
from his special representatives.
Organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
the Warsaw Treaty Organization also provide for intelligence gathering
and sharing. One of the major responsibilities of the NATO Secretariat
is to prepare Intelligence reports and digests, often using information
supplied by member countries.13
A variety of other international organizations, ranging from the In-
ternational Court of Justice to the International Labor Organization, in-
volve themselves on a regular or occasional basis in gathering, proces-
sing, and disseminating information of possible relevance to security.
The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is engaged
in the overt and clandestine collection, processing and dissemination
of intelligence, often bearing on security matters.
National governmental participants engaged in the performance of
the security intelligence function include specialized agencies.14 In
13To assist in the performance of this task, NATO maintains a Si-
tuation Centre and haa an Assistant Director for lutelligence on its
International Military Staff. NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook
15, 27 (1969); NATO Information Service, NATO-Facts and Figures (1962,
1969); and Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion" 47 For. Aff. 251-265;
at 257 (1969).
14
For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense In-
telligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Na-
tional Security Agency of the United States. See H. Ransom, The In-
telligence Establishment (1970), especially chs. IV, V, and VIII, for
a description of the respective American and.British"intelligence com-
munities"; the Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security
(KGB), and the Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the Ministry of
Defense of the Soviet Union. For descriptions of the Soviet Govern-
ment's intelligence agencies, see R. Hingley, The Russian Secret Po-
lice, 224-270 (1970), and R. Seth, Unmasked! The Story of Soviet Es-
pionage (1965); the British M.I. 5 and M.I. 6; the French SIS; the Is-
raeli Central Institute for Intelligence and Security and the General
Security Services. See Tadmor, The Silent Warriors (Rothstein, trans.)
1969, and Jacobs, "Israel's Early Warning System in the Arab Uorld",
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, VI, 1970 at 23-25, 85-90; and the Egyptian Gener-
al Intelligence Agency.
terms of the volume of security intelligence gathered, however, these
specialized intelligence agencies are surpassed by foreign, defense,
commerce, and other ministries which, in the normal course of decision,
amass vast amounts of information relevant to security purposes. Di-
plomatic and other governmental personnel stationed abroad play a cru-
cial role in transmitting information about their host countries and,
alternately, about their own nation-state to the host countries.
Non-governmental participants include political and other organi-
zations, business associations, interest groups, and individuals. The
Cominform, an intelligence gathering and sharing network which from 19-
47 to 1953 linked all Cocunist parties with the Soviet Communist Party,
and a similar organization linking overseas Chinese communities with
the Chinese Communist Party, are typical of such participants. Reli-
gious organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, the Roman
Catholic Church, with its worldwide system of Papal nuncios accredited
both to national bishops and governments, and the Buddhist associations,
are representative of non-political organizations which also carry out'
this function.
Private enterprise is also an important participant in the perfor-
mance of the security intelligence function, The Rand Corporation and
the Hudson Institute exemplify the numerous research organizations de-
voted to the task of collecting, processing, and distributing informa-
tion on a wide range of subjects, including security. Industrial con-
cerns continually seek new sources of and outlets for their products.
This often involves gathering and sharing information of possible re-
levance to security.
Other organizations concerned specifically with the collection,
interpretation, and transmissiou of information are universities and
colleges. Whether directly associated with government in the perfor-
mance of the security intelligence function,15 or independent,16 aca-
demic institutions are crucial participants in the performance of this
function.
15As disclosed with respect to a number of American universities,
including Michigan State University, which provided support, including
cover, for Central Intelligence Agency operations in South Vietnam from
1955 through 1959, N. Y. Times, April 14, 1966, at 1; and the Interna-
tional Studies Center of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whose
director, Mr. Milikan, admitted receiving funds from the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which he indicated were used for academic research, not
overseas operations. Id. April 18, 1966, at 4.
1 6Such as the British Institute for Strategic Studies and the Ins-
titute for Advanced Study at Princeton University.
Individuals as such are involved at every stage of the performance
of the security intelligence function. On the international level, at-
tendance at specialized conferences, conventions, and-the like can pro-
vide opportunities both for gathering and sharing information relevant
to security. This is particularly the case at meetings of scientists,
educators, and other specialists, where the international recognition
accorded scientific and other expertise often prompts information and
sharing and assures a respectful reception for information actually
shared. Other forms of individual participation in the security in-
telligence function include the normal contacts of businessmen, stu-
dents, and others with their counterparts abroad. Such contacts in-
volve the exchange of a wide range of information, much of it relevant
to security. Also, observations by tourists traveling abroad can pro-
duce significant intelligence data if reported.
B. Perspectives
Trends in the performance of the security intelligence function
reveal a growing inclusivity in some areas and continued exclusivity
in others. Examples of the former include the exchange of photographs
and other information obtained by the Soviet Union and the United States
n their respective space exploration efforts; the cooperation afforded
by the United States to Soviet intelligence gathering and fishing traw-
lers in distress off the American coast; and the exchange of captured
and convicted intelligence gathering operatives, as in the Abel-Powers
case. On the other hand, the seizure of the American intelligence ga-
thering vessel Pueblo and the downing of a U.S. EC-121 surveillance air-
craft by the North Koreans and an American RB-47 aircraft by the Soviet
Union demonstrate a persistent exclusivity.
Each participant engaged In gathering security intelligence seeks
to maximize its value position in relation to those of other partici-
pants. However, no participant possessing nuclear weapons in its ar-
senal has yet chosen to launch a surprise, or preemptive, strike using
such weapons against another participant, no doubt due in large measure
to the projections of severe mutual losses which would result.
Thus, while each participant makes demands for more intelligence
in order to enhance its own security, there is a growing recognition
of the need to collaborate in the performance of the security intelli-
gence function if mutual security is to be achieved. Such international
regional organizations as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization at
least provide for sharing information among allies, while the Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks and the disarmament negotiations at Geneva pro-
vide, at the least, a means of sharing some such information among po-
tential opponerts.
Such collaborative perspectives, however, appear at present to be
more characteristic of the major, or nuclear, participants in their re-
lations with each other and with their allies than of the non-nuclear
participants, The non-nuclear participants may not be as likely, with-
out the expectation of severe deprivations which would accompany the
use of nuclear weapons, to develop perspectives favoring collaboration
in the performance of the security intelligence function. Security for
such participants appears to involve certain exclusive perspectives,
even though such perspectives may have the effect over time of breeding
suspicion and distrust and increasing the likelihood of resort to vio-
lence unauthorized by community expectations. In light of the expecta-
tions of immiment or actual violence in such areas as the Middle East,
the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, past trends among a number
of non-nuclear participants have not been favorable to the development
of colloborative perspectives in the performance of the security in-
telligence function.
Furthermore, in crisis situations, the general pattern is a restric-
tion by all participants of shared activities and knowledge transfer,
especially intelligence gathering and sharing for security purposes.
The expectation arises that a curtailed exchange of values with other
participants will produce strategic or tactical advantage. Such re-
strictive policies, however, can seriously diminish the realism of ex-
pectations and contribute to a resort to violence.
C. Situations
The performance of the security intelligence function involves a
variety of different situations. While to an increasing extent, par-
ticularly in the case of shared international resources (the high seas,
the airspace above and outer space), these situations are open to all
participants, a preferred policy of open access, subject to essential
public order requirements, does not characterize the performance of this
'function in and immediately about the territory of nation-states at pre-
sent.
The developing international law on gathering and sharing security
Intelligence may be considered in terms of the various situations to
which it applies:
1. Legality of the Security Intelligence Function Conducted
in Shared International Resources
Situations in which the performance of the security intelligence
fundtion is clearly lawful, that is, supported by customary constitu-
tive prescriptions, include those occurring within shared international
resources (the high seas, the airspace above and outer space), provided
they are conducted in such a manner as not to interfere with lawful uses
of such resources by other participants or to engender serious depriva-
tions in or about the territory of other participants.1 7 The gathering
and sharing of security intelligence within shared international resources
Is thus not unlawful per se; rather, it is only unlawful when it Inter-
feres with other legitimate uses of such resources or with valid claims
of coastal states.18 Furthermore, only in situations in which a partici-
17The najor participants in the international arena carry out an
extensive intelligence gathering effort on the high seas, and in the
airspace above. See "U.S. and Russia: How to Play 'I Spy' on a Glo-
bal Scale," N.Y. Times, March 14, 1971, IV, at 3:1-2. Goulden details
a variety of security intelligence efforts performed by, respectively,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, among others: "[tmeri-
can] oceanographic research vessels [in circumnavigating the Arctic
Ocean, attempted to pass near the Soviet nuclear weapons test installa-
tions at Novaya Zemlya and Severnaya Zemiya, to test]. . capabilities
and frequencies of the radar system guarding the Soviet's new anti-bal-
listic missile system, one anchor of which is south of Novaya Zemlya,
the other slightly to the west of Severnaya Zemlya; (and to investigate]
possible routes for Polaris submarines to follow during their frequent
forays along the northern tier of the Soviet Union. . .;" the monitor-
Ing by U.S. vessels of Cuban communications and broadcasts and the ob-
servation of vessels using Cuban harbors; the Cuban and Soviet "oceano-
graphic research" efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, observing U.S. subma-
rine warfare exercises and charting contours of the ocean bottom, and
off the eastern Florida coast observing operations at Cape Kennedy; and
the Soviet surveillance of NATO naval exercises and, during July 1967,
Soviet monitoring of activities in Communist China from vessels off
the East China coast. J. Goulden, Truth is the First Casualty, 117-
121 (1969). See also Klass, "Keeping the Nuclear Peace: Spies in the
Sky," N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1972, VI, at 7.
18Cases upholding this perspective include, first, the Trail Smel-
ter Arbitration, U.S. Dept. of State Arbitration Series 8 (1941); also
quoted in H. Briggs, The Law of Nations 310 (2nd ed., 1952), between
Canada and the United States, decided on March 11, 1941, for causing or
permitting serious deprivations to occur in the territory of another
state. The Tribunal held that "under the principles of international
law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein when the case is of serious consequence and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 310.
pant is suffering serious deprivations caused by the actions of another
may it take self-defense or self-help measures.1 9
A recent authoritative pronouncement favoring inclusive use of the
high seas, subject to each participant exercising due regard for the si-
milar interests of others, is contained in the Convention on the High
Seas.
20
The International Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel Case (Mer-
its), [1949] I.C.J. 22, decided April 9, 1949, and involving Albania and
the United Kingdom, stated that:
(T]he obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authori-
ties consisted in notifying, for the benefit of ship-
ping in general, the existence of a minefield in Al-
banian territorial waters and in warning the approach-
ing British warships of the imminent dangers to which
the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based,
not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is
applicable in time of war, but on certain general and
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary consi-
derations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime commu-
nication; and every State's obligation not to allow its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States.
19See, e.g., the case of the Caroline, 2 Moore, A Digest of Inter-
national Law 412 (1906), involving the destruction by British forces of
a vessel in American waters used in connection with an armed uprising in
Canada, which was justified as a legitimate act of self-defense. Such
measures must comply with the standards formulated by Daniel Webster, the
American Secretary of State, in his letter of April 24, 1841, to Fox, the
.British Minister in Washington, protesting the destruttion of the Caroline;
Webster's criteria for legitimate recourse to a "necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deli-
beration. . . [and], even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized
them to enter the territories of the [other state] at all, [that they] did
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, Justified by the necessi-
ty of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it". Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841; Brit. Parliamentary Papers,
Vol. LXI (1843); 29 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 1138; quoted in R. Jen-
nings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 82, 89 (1938),
quoted in Briggs, supra note 18, at 985.
20U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.53, reprinted in 38 Dept. of State Bull.
1115 (1958) and in 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 842-851 (1958). Article 2 pro-
vides:
2. Legality of the Security Intelligence Function Conducted
in the Territorial Sea
Determination of the legality of the performance of the security in-
telligence function in the territorial seas of nation-states requires con-
textual analysis to ascertain the validity of the often conflicting claims
advanced by participants. The notion of a "territorial sea" itself is a
shorthand device signifying the importance accorded to exclusive claims
The high seas [defined in Article 1 as 'all parts of
the sea that are not included in the territorial sea
or in the internal waters of a State'] being open to
all nations, no state may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
by these Articles and by the other rules of interna-
tional law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coas-
tal and non-coastal States: (1) freedom of navigation;
0 • . (4) freedom to fly over the high seas. These
freedoms, and others which are recognized by the gen-
eral principles of international law, shall be exer-
cised by all States with reasonable regard to the
Interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas.
Id. at 842-43.
Also of relevance to the performance of the security intelligence
function on the high seas are Article 8 of the same Convention, which
piovides in part that "warships on the high seas have complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flaa State." Id. at
842. And Article 9, which provides that "[sihips owned or operated by
a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall, on the
high seas, have complete irmunity from the jurisdiction of any State other
than the flag state," id. at 844. However, as Judge Moore recognized in
his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case, there are limits to this immu-
nity: "In conformity with the principle of the equality of independent
States, all nations have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the
unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation, and no State is
authorized to interfere with the navigation of other States on the high
seas in ti=x of peace except in the case of piracy by the law of nations
or in extraordinary cases of self-defence (Le Louis, 1817, 2 Dodson 210,
243-44)." Lotus (Moore, Jr., dissenting), P.C.I;J,, Ser. A., No. 10, 25
(1927); quoted in Briggs, supra note 18, at 329.
of participants with respect to the waters lying immediately off their
coastlines. These claims generally involve the security interests of
coastal states and their interest in exploiting the resources to be found
within these waters.21 Claims by participants to exercise a high degree
of exclusive competence over these waters are usually expressed by de-
limiting a certain width of such waters and labeling it as a "territorial
sea" .22
Important inclusive interests, however, also exist with respect to
the territorial seas, most often concerning international security, com-
municatlons, and shipping.2
3
The performance of the security intelligence function in the terri-
torial seas of other participants usually consists either of "passive"
surveillance of coastal states and monitoring of their communications,
or "active" penetration of their defense zones (which usually encompass,
at a minimum, their territorial seas) for the purpose of activating de-
fense-warning systems. This generally involves identifying the type of
radar or other defense-warning system activated and recording the inten-
sity, range, and duration of the signals emitted.
2 1M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans-A Con-
temporary International Law of the Sea 174 (1958).
22The United States which, together with the United Kingdom, France,
and most of the nation-states of Europe and the Commonwealth, had claimed
a territorial sea three miles wide, has now proposed, with the support of
the Soviet Union, a new international limit of twelve miles for the width
of territorial seas. The Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China,
the United Arab Republic, North Vietnam, and a number of other nation-
states already claim territorial seas twelve miles wide, and this width
appears to be gaining acceptance as an international standard. However,
a number of states are pressing for wider territorial seas. Prominent
among these are Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Senegal,
and Uruguay, all of which claim territorial seas two hundred miles wide.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty
of the Sea (Geographic Bulletin No. e) at 5, 28029 (1969).
23eDougal & Burke, supra note 21, at 174.
Past trends with respect to "passive" observation and monitoring
conducted from the territorial seas indicate a preference for inclu-
sive interests. Authoritative prescriptions favoring a variety of
uses of the territorial seas for inclusive purposes are found in the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 24
The rules applicable to all ships enunciated in the Convention on the
right of innocent passage are of particular relevance to the conduct
of the security intelligence function within the territorial seas.25
2U. N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.52; reprinted in 38 Dept. State Bull. 1111
(1958) and 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 834-42 (1958).
25Article 14 provides in part:
1. Subject to the provisions of these Articles, ships
of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial
sea for the purpose either of traversing that sea with-
out entering internal waters [enphasis added], or of
proceeding to internal waters, or of making for the
high seas from internal waters.
3. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only
insofar as the same are incidental to ordinary naviga-
tion or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by
distress.
4. Passage is innocent so long as it Is not prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order, or security of the coas-
tal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with these Articles and with other rules of internation-
al law...
6. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag.
Article 15 provides in part that "the coastal State must not hamper inno-
cent passage through the territorial sea." Id. Article 16 states, how-
ever, that:
1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in
its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not in-
nocent. . .
"Passive" observation and monitoring, especially when conducted by
3. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph 4, the
coastal State may, without discrimination mzcngst
foreigm ships, suspeud temporarily in specified areas
of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign
ships if such suspension is essential for the protec-
tion of its security. Such suspension shall take ef-
fect only after having been duly published.
This right of suspension, however, is not unlimited. Article 16 also
provides that:
4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage
of foreign ships through straits which are used for
international navigation between one part of the high
seas and another Part of the high seas or the terri-
torial sea of a foreign State.
The rules in the Convention applicable to government ships other
than warships and operated for non-commercial purposes, and thus of
relevance to the security intelligence function as performed in the
territorial seas, are set forth in Article 22, which provides in part
that:
With such exceptions as are contained in Rrticles
14, 15, 16, and 17, in regard to innocent passage
above, and Article 18, stating that 'no charge may
be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their
passage through the territorial sea' and that 'char-
ges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through
the territorial sea as payment only for specific ser-
vices rendered to the ship']. . . , nothing in these
Articles affects the immunities which such ships en-
joy under these Articles or other rules of interna-
tional law.
The only rule specifically applicable to warships, also of use in the
performance of the security intelligence function, is contained in Ar-
ticle 23, which provides that:
[i]f any warship does not comply with the regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea and disregards any request for com-
pliance which is made to it, the coastal State may
require the warship to leave the territorial sea.
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non-military governmental or private vessels within the territorial
sea of another state, would seem to pose little threat to the latter's
security. It is difficult to envision circumstances which would autho-
rize, consistent with community expectations, a participant to take se-
vere retaliatory measures against another participant engaged in such
passive intelligence gathering.2 7
The Soviet Union, joined by the Eastern European states, while par-
ticipating in and adhering to the Convention, submitted the following re-
pezvations to Articles 20 and 23, respectively:
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics considers that government ships in foreign
territorial waters have immunity and that the measures
mentioned in this Article may therefore be applied
to them only with the consent of the flag State.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers that a
coastal State has the right to establish procedures
for the authoritation of the passage of foreign war-
ships through its territorial waters.
26Even in the case of passage of uarships through straits located
in the territorial sea but used fcr navigation between two parts of the
high seas, there exists authoritative support for inclusive interests.
See the Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. 4, 28. While the
scope of innocent passage permitted a participant's warships through
the territorial sea of another state in peacetime is thus limited in
the Court's opinion to "straits used for international navigation be-
tween two parts of the high seas", the clear implication o the case
indicatos a strong preferance for inclusive use. Furthermore, the Court
employed a criterion of mere, not substantial, use of such straits for
international navigation as sufficient to qualify such straits for in-
nocent passage by a participant's warships in time of peace.
2 7 Rubin indicates by analogy to such activities when conducted
from "contiguous land",
at least under current practice apparently ac-
cepted as legitimate, states do eavesdrop from land
bases on each other's electronic emissions and no
countermeasures against foreign territory are known
ever to have been publicly justified on grounds of
. security need to stop the eavesdropping. If the
-ord 'security' in the normal formulation of the law
The difficulty of distinguishing between a situation involving such
"passive" observation and monitoring and one involving simple innocent
passage by governmental or private vessels through the teiritorial sea
of another nation-state would tend to favor inclusive interests here.
The normal requirements of navigation, including the taking of bearings
by reference to stationary points on land, involve many of the same
tasks associated with "passive" observation and monitoring of a coas-
tal state.
The same inclusive regime favoring the right of innocent passage
and, by implication, "passive" observation and monitoring of a coastal
state by the vessels of another participant in the former's territorial
sea, has not applied to aircraft in the airspace above the territorial
sea, both for commercial 2 8 and security 9 reasons. However, major par-
of innocent passage were interpreted to prevent pas-
sive listening by a foreign vessel, it is hard to
see what passage would still necessarily be consi-
dered 'innocent'-certainly no passage of any state-
operated vessel.
28 Air rights for commercial aviatio.i are less flexible
than regulations for water transit, and rigidly re-
strict air routes to jurisdictional rather than geo-
graphic patterns. The right of aircraft to oerfly
territorial waters is the same as for sovereign land
areas of the coastal state since no 'right of inno-
cent passage' exists as for surface craft. Precedent
for these restrictions goes back to the various con-
ventions and agreements made during the first half
of the century, particularly the Chicago Conference
of 1944. At that time an effort was made to estab-
lish air transit rights other than by bilateral agree-
ment. An International Air Services Transit Agree-
ment was enacted and accepted by most members of the
International Civil Aviation Organization. It entailed
two privileges, . . . (1) Ohe privilege to fly across
the territory of another state without landing; and
(2) the privilege to land for nontraffic purposes.
Rights granted to aircraft of one state operating
in the airspace of another, however, are subject
to limitations in accordance with the latter's own
civil aviation authority. For example, certain air
corridors may be designated, or approval foi flight
may be subject to specific rules or denied at any
time.
ticipants appear to tolerate the entry of each other's aircraft within
the airspace above their own territorial seas for the purpose of "1pas-
sive" observation and monitoring, at least to the extent of not auto-
matically destroying such aircraft.
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dept. of State, Sovereignty
of the Sea (Geographic Bulletin No. 3, 1969).
Planes of any given state may fly over the terri-
torial sea of any other Etate only with its con-
sent. Such privileges are not always assured in
the present-day world. Thus, the complicated
route structure of international airways with
their technical requirements must, in all cases,
conform to the sovereign pattern of land and the
marginal seas.
Id. at 10.
29The military aircraft of a participant operating in the airspace
above the territorial sea of another state are subject to a more strin-
gent regime than are surface vessels, including warships: "Flight of
military aircraft must adhere strictly to practices incorporated in law
of the Sea conventions. In fact, the shooting down of military planes
which stray over the territorial waters as well as land territory of
an unfriendly state is by no means unknown." Id. at 10. The United
States sought in three instances to adjudicate before the International
Court of Justice claims for compensation arising from losses caused by
the downing of aircraft, which, although, according to the United States,
over international waters at the time, were engaged in surveillance and
monitoring off the coast of the Soviet Union. In none of these cases,
however, did the Soviet Union accept the Court's jurisdiction, there-
fore requiring the Court to remove the cases from its List.
30Lissitzyn observes that even during the tense period of confron-
tation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the early
1950's, "[i]n many instances, evcn when such intrusions occurred across
the Iron Curtain, the intruding aricraft, whether civil or military,
and their occupants were released and permitted to leave. In some in-
stances, no action was taken to control the intruder's movements, al-
though diplomatic protests may have been subsequently lodged with their
governments. In some other instances, the intruding aircraft were fired
upon." Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Current Prac-
tice and International Law," 47 Am. J. Intrl L. 559, 569 (1953). Even
in the last-mentioned instances, however, the Soviet Union stressed either
that it was not the first to open fire or, if it was, that such fire was
intended as a warning only. I1d. at 580.
An argument may be made, however, by the smaller participants in
the international arena in favor of greate exclusivity in regard to
the use of the territorial sea. This perspective rests primarily up-
on the premise that it is inequitable to favor inclusive interests
here, since what this in fact means is that only those participants
capable of marshalling the resources and expertise required for the
performance of the security intelligence function in the territorial
seas (i.e., the major participants) will be able to take advantage of
this inclusivity.31
Past trends support in some measure such exclusive claims, advan-
ced especially by smaller participants in the international area. Ex-
treme reactions to gathering security intelligence by means of electro-
nic surveillance and monitoring include the North Korean seizure of the
USS Pueblo off the coast of North Korea32 in 1968 and the internment of
* The perspective of the United States indicates a similar desire to avoid
attacking an aircraft entering the airspace above the territorial sea
* unless it is clear that the latter is actually engaged in an attack. Id.
at 579.
31Butler observes with respect to the intelligence gathering acti-.
vities of a participant's vessels in the territorial sea of another
state:
(Such a vessel] . . . not only carries away visual
Impressions of the external appearance of a country
along the coast; it pierces the very interstices of
the defense establishment by monitoring inland com-
munications, by identlifying--perhaps Jacming--inland
radar installations, and by performing the variety
of other tasks for which electronics surveillance is
suited. The result is that the flag state of the in-
telligence vessel obtains vastly more detailed, com-
posite data on the defense establishment of the coas-
tal nation than the latter can obtain on the observing
state, unless the coastal state also has the resources
and know-how to engage in reciprocal activity. Under
such circumstances, it is hardly unexpected for small
coastal countries to question the appropriateness of
granting absolute immunity to electronics intelligence
vessels or to seek other means for redressing their
comparative technological disadvantage in electronics.
Butler, "The Pueblo Crisis: Some Critical Reflections", in [1969] Proceed-
ings, 8.
32There is some dispute as to whether or not the USS Pu'blo intruded
its crew for several months; the downing of a U.S. EC-121 aircraft enga-
ged in electronic intelligence gathering over forty miles off the North
Korean coast; the attack on the USS Liberty, a sister ship of the Pueblo,
on the high seas north of the Sinai Peninsula during the 1967 SLx-Day
War; and the seizure in two instances by Latin American coastal states
of Soviet intelligence gathering vessels.33 Less extreme reactions
available to the coastal state include requesting the vessel or air-
craft engaged in electronics intelligence gathering to cease such acti-
vit!es and, in the event of noncompliance, seeking to require it to leave
the territorial waters.34
into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea prior to its seizure
in 1968. The U.S. position is that the vessel was seized 15.3 miles
from the nearest part of North Korea; the North Koreans claim that it
was seized 7.6 miles from the North Korean coast. The U.S. claims a
territorial sea 3 miles wide; the North Koreans claim a width of 12 miles.
While subsequent investigation confirmed that the seizure occurred be-
yond the 12-mile territorial sea claimed by North Korea, Aldrich, "Ques-
tions of International Law Raised by the Seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo,"
In Proceedings, supra note 31 at 3, some question remains as to whether
the Pueblo may have accidentally come within the 12-mile territorial sea
claimed by North Korea. Butler presents two sources for this: first,
"although the Pueblo was under specific secret crders not to penetrate
the North Korean 12-mile belt of territorial waters, missions prior to
the Pueblo were apparently authorized by a general order dated February
28, 1966, to approach up to three miles of the North Korean coast (N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1968, at 20)." Butler, supra note 31 at 10. Second,
". .. testimony at the Court of inquiry revealed the Pueblo's main na-
vigational system developed errors as great as five miles. Even though
other aids were frequently employed by Pueblo officers, there is no ab-
solute assurance that at some point the vessel did not violate the North
Korean boundary." Id. at 10.
33N.Y. Times, June 12, 1968, at 1; referred to in Butler, supra note
31 at 9, N.9. Butler states with respect to such reactions that "a sur-
prise armed attack . . . is clearly a disproportionate response to the
threat posed by an electronics intelligence vessel, but it nevertheless
is illustrative of the magnitude of concern felt by the coastal state."
Id* at 9.
3 4 1n compliance with the scheme envisioned by Article 23 of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. U.N. Doz. A/Conf.
13/L.53; reprinted in 38 Dept. of State Bull. 1111 (1958) and 52 Am. J.
Int'l L. 834, 840 (1958); Aldrich, supra note 32, at 3.
It is doubtful, however, whether this argument in favor of exclusi-
vity advanced on behalf of the smaller participants gives rise to a right
of self-defense on their part. The attacks against and seizures of elec-
tronics intelligence gathering vessels and aircraft seem clearly out of
proportion to the dangers posed to the coastal state's security by an-
other participant's "passive" observation and monitoring of communica-
tions within the coastal state. "Passive" electronics intelligence ga-
thering and visual observation can hardly be conceived of as an "armed
attack" per se nor even as creating a reasonable apprehension of such
attack in most instances.35 While it could be argued that vessels and
aircraft engaged in such "passive" monitoring and observation could be
employed to obstruct or destroy the operation of a coastal state's de-
fense-warning system and jam its communications network,3 6 such "active"
3 5Though the right of self-defense in both customary law and Article
51 of the U.N. Charter allows an endangered state to act against an im-
minent threat, in order for its acts of intense coercion to be lawful,
they must satisfy not only a principle of necessity, but a principle of
proportionality. McDougal & Feliciano, suDr note 2, at 198-203. Since
self-defense is self-help in extremis, its necessity must be grounded in
an imminent and unlawful threat to the vital values of a territorial
community. See W. Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review
and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards 836ff (1971).
36But, ef. Butler's sympathetic comments on North Korea's action
against the Pueblo:
North Korea characterized the seizure as a 'decisive
measure of self-defense.' A right of self-defense
has always been recognized by international law, al-
though more recently the exercise of the right as a
matter of law has been restricted to instances of armed
attack or, perhaps, an immediate threat of armed at-
tack. Apprehension of the introduction of Soviet
missiles into Cuba led the United States to invoke
the principle of collective self-defense and to es-
tablish a naval quarantine in 1962. At stake was
probably not a threat of armed attack, but a funda-
mental reordering of the balance of power in the
Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. The principles
of self-defense and freedom of the seas acquired
a new dimension as a result of the Cuban crisis.
North Korea's situation is indeed different, yet
the threat to its defense establishment perceived
by North Korea in the operations of the Pueblo and
similar vessels may have been as imminent as the
Cuban threat was to us. North Korea was confronted
measures have not characterized the operations of such electronic intelli-
gence gathering vessels as the Pueblo, the Liberty, and the Soviet ships
seized off the coast of Latin America, or of the U.S. EC-121 aircraft downed
by the North Koreans. What evidence exists concerning "active" electronic
intelligence gathering, which usually involves the penetration of a par-
ticipant's defense-warning system for the purpose of activating it, is
confined to interactions among the major participants in the international
arena. The latter appear to tolerate a threshold level just short of tem-
porary interference and, of course, permanent damage to their defense-
warning systems.
Past trends with respect to the second type of security intelligence
function conducted by participants within the territorial seas of other
nation-states-penetration of a coastal state's defense zones for the
purpose of activating defense-warning systEms--may be considered in terms
of the two principal sets of responses which it evokes. The first, charac-
teristic of the major participants, is an increasing degree of mutual
tolerance for this practice. With the growing technological sophistica-
tion of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and of the means to pro-
tect them, deterrence requires more than simply knowing the location of
significant targets and how to reach them in a second, or retaliatory,
strike. It also requires the identification and development of means to
overcome a potential opponent's defense-warning systems, such as radar
and anti-ballistic missile systems.37 Without such knowledge, a major
participant would not be confident of retaining an effective second-strike
capability, sufficient to deter other participants from striking first
with nuclear weapons. Alternatively, in the absence of adequate security
intelligence with respect to a potential opponent's capabilities and in-
tentions, a participant might consider in a crisis that it has no choice
but to strike first or be attacked and destroyed.
by vessels which penetrated the heart of its defense net-
work and which were operated by its primary adversary in
the Korean conflict. To conclude the Pueblo posed no
threat of armed attack against North Korea begs the ques-
tion; the threat posed by the Pueblo was the acquisition
of data that could render the coastal state defense es-
tablishment vulnerable. The problem of secrecy is some-
thing with which all states must live, but they live
with it to an unequal degree. North Korea possessed no
comparable capability to obtain equivalent data on the
United States defense system. If there is no precedent
or scholarly support for invoking self-defense in this
kind of situation, neither is there a large body of ex-
perience with this enormous technological gap which pre-
sently exists between naval Powers and smaller coastal
Powers.
Butler, supra note 31, at 10, 11.
3 7For detailed information on such'intelligence gathering, see Goul-
den, supra note 17 at 110-.11.
It is doubtful, however, Jn view of the incidents involvi.ng the
Pueblo, the Libert , and the seizure of two Soviet intelligence gathering
vessels off the coast of Latin America, whether the smaller participants
would tolerate penetration of their defense zones by other participants
for the purpose of activating their defense-warning systems, assuming
they had such systems. The perspective of any such participant would
most likely be influenced by its level of technological sophistication
and that of its potential adversaries, as well as its perception of the
likelihood of attack by the participant conducting such "active" elec-
tronics intelligence gathering.
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3. Legality of the Security Intelligence Function Conducted
in the Contiguous Zone
The performance of the security intelligence function in the waters
and airspace contiguous to the territorial seas of coastal states gives
rise to many of the same issues as does its performance within and above
the territorial sea. While the intensity of exclusive claims with re-
spect to the contiguous zone is likely to be less, such claims typically
are asserted in reference to the security, health, customs, and immigra-
tion interests of the coastal state. Exclusive claims are also likely
to be asserted with respect to the exploitation of resources, especially
fisheries and mineral deposits, in the contiguous zone. However, the
burden of establishing the validity of such claims rests on those who
assert them to a greater extent than in situations involving the terri-
torial seas. While there is no inherent conflict between such exclusive
claims, particularly those relating to the health, customs, and immigra-
tion interests of the coastal state, and the performance of the security
intelligence function by a participant within the zone contiguous to the
territorial sea of another, the possibility exists of such a conflict,
especially involving exclusive security claims.
Authoritative international perscriptions favor inclusive use of
the contiguous zone in a wide variety of situations.3 9 There are, how-
3 81n the case of non-nuclear participants, such penetration for the
purpose of activating defense-warning systems, in the absence of the re-
straint which the possession of nuclear weapons might otherwise impose,
would appear to be more provocative than beneficial for minimum order,
and be so regarded by their potential opponents.
39The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone limits the exclusive interests which coastal states may advance
with respect to the use of contiguous zones to narrow classes of situa-
tions. Article 24 of the Convention provides:
ever, certain exclusive claims which deserve recognition,40 particularlythose relating to the control of air traffic41 and the temporary use of
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial
sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(A) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary regulations within its
territory or territorial sea;
(B) punish infringement of the above regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
U.N. Doc. A!Conf.13/L.52; sup-;a note 34, 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 834, 840 (1958).
Beyond these limited exclusive interests, however, the clear implication
of the Convention is to favor inclusive uses of the contiguous zones in
most contexts. Nonetheless, it is probable that state- ;ill not abide
by these limits, particularly in reference to security :ones beyond a
width of twalve miles. See McDougal & Burke,supra note 21 at 594-598.
The m4jor problem in specific strategy posed by claims
to exclusive authority in contiguous zones is . . . co
permit the necessary extensions of coastal authority
for protection of uniquely affected coastal interests
and, simultaneously, to promote and to protect the wi-
dest possible range of inclusive uses and interests,
free of coastal interference. Accommodation of the
resulting conflicts between inclusive and exclusive
interests has been achieved historically by applica-
tion of a standard of reasonableness, requiring a
disciplined multifactoral analysis to avoid arbitrary
decision.
Id. at 579.
4 1The United States has promulgated "rules for operating civil air-
craft in a defense area, or into, vithin, or out of the United States."
14 C.P.R. Sec. 99.1 (A) (1970). This authority derives from the powers
accorded the Administrator of the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency to desig-
nate certain zones in U.S. airspace in which he may prohibit or restrict
flights of aircraft which he cannot otherwise identify and control. 49'
such zones (as vell as the high seas beyond) for exercises by military
aircraft and vessels and for the testing of ballistic missiles.
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U.S.C.A. Sec. 1522 (1958). He is empowered to create "Air Defense Iden-
tification Zones" ("ADIZ's"), which are defined as "areas of airspace
over land or water in which the ready identification, location, and con-
trol of civil aircraft is required in the interest of national security."
14 C.F.R. Sec. 99.3(A) (1970).
These rules require the filing of a flight plan with an appropriate
aeronautical facility and position reports for aircraft operating in or
penetrating a domestic tDIZ or entering the United States through a coas-
tal ADIZ oz through "Distant Early Warning Identification Zones". Speci-
fically, foreign aircraft entering the United States must comply with the
following provision:
In addition to such other reports as ATC [Air Traffic
Control] may require, no pilot in command of a foreign
civil aircraft may enter the United States through a
coastal ADIZ unless he makes the reports required in
section 99.17 or section 99.19 [position reports for
aircraft operating in or penetrating a domestic ADIZ]
or reports the position of the aircraft when it is not
less than one hour and not more than two hours average
cruising disthnce from the United States.
14 C.F.R. Sec. 99.23 (1970).
The United States is not alone in designating such aerial zones.
Canada has created similar zones and requires aircraft to give position
reports even when such aircraft are not flying to or from Canada. Se-
curity Control of Air Traffic Order, Air Navigation Order Series V., No.
14, in Air Laws and Treatios of the World, 323, 324, 87th Cong., ist Sess.
(1961); referred to in McDougal & Burke, supra note 21 at 593, n. 85.
"(Claims for security purposes] sometimes extend into areas having no
unique geographic nexus to the claimant state, yet it is generally agreed
that these exclusive areas are reasonable and ought, in mutual tolerance,
to be recognized." McDougal & Burke at 593.
4 2See McDougal & Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective and
Lawful Measures for Security", 64 Yale L. J. 648, 678-681 (1955). Other
types of exclusive claims over contiguous zones are exemplified by the
security zone created by twenty-one states of the Western Hemisphere
by the Declaration of Panama in 1940. This Declaration provided in part:
In view of the variety of significant inclusive interests affecting
As a measure of continental self-protection, the Ameri-
can Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrali-
ty, are as of inherent right entitled to have those wa-
ters adjacent to the American continent, which they re-
gard as of primary concern and direct utility in their
relations, free from the cohission of any hostile act
by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such
hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea, or
air.
"International Conferences of American States, 1933-40", 334 (1st Supp.
1940), reprinted in 34 A.J.I.L. Supp. 17 (1940); quoted in IMcDougal and
Burke, supra note 21 at 590. As McDougal and Burke indicate, this se-
curity zone extended from a minimum of 300 miles in width to a maximum
of 1,200 miles from the coast in some places. Masterson, "The Hemisphere
Zone of Security and the Law", 26 A.B.A.J. 860, 861 (1940). In addition,
although the belligerents protested the legality of such a zone and on
several occasions engaged in hostilities within it, u[i]nfluential publi-
cists have affirmed the soundness of the principle embodied in the Declara-
tion, conceding the validity of objections to enforcement only in the par-
ticular instances in which enforcement could be shown to be unreasonable."
Brown, "Protective Jurisdiction", 34 A.J.I.L. 112 (1940); Fenwick, "The
Declaration of Panama", 34 A.J.I.L. 116 (1940); "The Exercise of Juris-
diction for Special Purposes in ligh Seas Areas Beyond the Outcr Limit
of Territorial Waters", address by W. W. Bishop, Jr., before the Inter-
American Bar Association, May 1949, 4-5, Masterson, supra, at 862-863.
Cf. Gidel, Memorandum, 34-36; quoted in McDougal & Burke, supra note 21
at 591, n.73.
A further example of the creation of such security zones in the wa-
ters contiguous to the territorial seas of coastal states is presented
by Article II, sections 15 and 16, of the 1953 Armistice Agreement in
Korea, which provide:
15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all
opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall
respect the waters contIquous to the Demilitzri-
zed Zone and to the land area of Korea under the
military control of the opposing side, and shall
not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.
16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all
opposing air forces, which air force shall respect
the use of those areas contiguous to the territorial seas of coastal
states, contextual analysis is required to determine whether exclusive
claims deserve authoritative weight, with the burden cast against such
a presumption absent a strong showing of need.
4. Legality of the Security Intelligence Function Conducted
in the Airspace oi Nation-States
Situations involving the performance of the security intelligence
function in the airspace above the territory of ration-states preoenu
more complex questions of legality. Claims by participants to terri-
torial sovereignty, that is, to preeminence of a range of exclusive claims,
inthe airspace above national territory are usually recognized only with-
In the substratosphere superjacenr to the nation-states. However, authori-
tAtiva international prescriptions do support a variety of exclusive in-
terests in the airspace beneath the stratosphere above a state's terri-
tory.43
the air space above the Demilitarized Zone and over
the area of Korea under the military control of the
opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.
U.N. Doc. A/2431 and S/3079, Aug. 7, 1953; "Armistice in Korea: Selec-
ted Statements and Documents," U.S. Dept. of State Publication 3150 (Far
Eastern Series 61); 47 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 186, 192 (1953).
Aldrich states that, assuming the Pueblo was at the position claimed
by the North Koreans--7.6 miles off its coast--then "(i]n this latter
circumstance North Korea might. . . be able to claim a violation of the
1953 Armistice Agreement (Article 11[151) which requires naval vessels
to both sides to respect the waters contiguous to Korea, which were un-
derstood to extend twelve nautical miles to sea. However, such viola-
tion would not, by itself, give rise to any right to seize the ship."
Aldrich, supra note 32 at 1, 3, n.
43Article I of the 1919 Paris Convention on Aerial Navigation pro-
vided for the "[clomplete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above [national] territory and the territorial waters adjacent thereto."
International Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct.
13, 1919, 11 L.H.T.S. 173; the 1944 Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation, which superseded the Paris Convention, provides in Arti-
cle I that "[tihe Contracting States recognize that every State has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."
Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (effective April 4, 1947);
These prescriptions, however, do not give rise to an unlimited pre-
dominance by a nation-state's exclusive interests in the airspace with-
in the substratosphere above its territory. Aircraft in distress enter-
Ing the airspace of another nation-state are, according to authoritative
international agreement and customary international law, to be rendered
assistance by the latter state.44 For aircraft not in distress which en-
ter the airspace of another state, customary practice is to require that
some kind of warning be given indicating to the intruding aircraft that
it should leave the airspace of the state entered, follow a certain course,
or land where directed; before hostile measures may be taken against it." °
If the state entered perceives imminent danger to its security from
the entering aircraft, more difficult considerations arise. A balance
is required in each instance between, on the one hand, the safety of those
aboard the aircraft and, on the other, the interest of the state entered
in protecting itself.46 The determination of an appropriate response to
such aerial intrusion requires analysis of a variety of factors.4 7
both quoted in "Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer
Space", 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1074, 1076-7 (1960).
44Article 25 of the Chicago Convention, quoted in id. at 1078, n.
28.
4 51d. at 1078.
4 6As Lissitzyn observes, "in cases where there is reason to believe
that the intruder's intention may be hostile or illicit, a warning or or-
der to land should normally be first given and the intruder may be attacked-
if it disobeys. Lissitzyn, supra note 30, at 587.
.
4 7Lissitzyn notes the following:
Among the many relevant factors may be the character
of the intruding aircraft and the probable motives
for the intrusion, the proximity of the intrusion to
important installations, or to areas in which armed
hostilities (whether or not legally amounting to war)
are being carried on, the frequency and regularity of
intrusions by aircraft of a particular state, and the
availability of means for controlling the intruder's
movements.
Id. -at 586-587. Beyond a consideration of these factors would be an assess-
ment of possible responses in terms of whether they would give rise to re-
ciprocity and, possibly, retaliation.
The stratosphere and space beyond are considered sharedinternational
resources, subject to a regime similar to that which governs the use of
the high seas, the airspace above, and outer space. The reasons for making
a distinction at this point are "[i]n part because of an inability to con-
trol surveillance aircraft above a certain level, in part because of a
shared perception of common security needs..... .,"48 This distinction
rests not on the simple application of traditional legal norms to a novel
situation, but at least ini part on a shared recognition by participants
of common interests, both in terms of mutual security and the open and
safe exploration of space.
5. Legality of the Security Intelligence Function Conducted
in the Territory of Another Nation-State
Situations involving the performance of the security intelligence
function by a participant in the territory of another state present a
basic complementarity: all nation-states in the international arena
engage in such intelligence gathering, yet all continue to apply their
national statutes and policies against espionage.
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At the outset, it is necessary to recognize the traditional dis-
tinction made between such intelligence gathering conducted in wartime
on the one hand and in peacetime on the other. Insofar as the former
is concerned, even the traditional perspective admits that intelligence
gathering by a participant in the territory of a belligerent does not
contravene authoritative international prescriptions.50
48McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 8, at 394.
49Espionage, strictly speaking, refers to the activity, considered
a criminal offense under the laws of most nation-states, involving the
clandestine collection of security intelligence by the operatives of
one nation-state in the territory of another.
50The international legal regime applicable to "spies" in wartime
was narrowly delineated both by the First Hague Convention in 1899 and
the Hague Convention IV of 1907 as follows:
A person can only be considered a spy when, acting
clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or en-
deavors to obtain information in the zone of operations
of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating
It tc the hostile party.
. As such, while spying in wartime presents particular hazards to an
individual who engages in it in terms of the severe punishment, usually
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have pene-
trated into the zone of operations of the hostile army,
for the purpose of obtaining information, aze not con-
sidered spies. Similarly, the following are not con-
sidered spies: soldiers and civilians, carrying out
their mission openly, intrusted with the delivery of
dispatches intended either for theirown army or for
the enemy's army. To this class belong likewise per-
sons sent In balloons for the purpose of carrying des-
patches and, generally, of maintaining communications
between the different parts of an army or a territory.
Article XXIX of the Annex of Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land to Hague Convention IV of 1907; quoted in M. Whiteman, 10
Digest of International Law 178 (1968).
A spy taken in the act shall not be punished with-
out previous trial.
Article XXX, id. at 179.
spy who, after rejoining the army to which he
belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is
treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no respon-
sibility for his previous acts of espionage.
Article XXI, ibid. In observing that the employment of spies does not
contravene the laws of war, the United States Army Field Manual (1956)
elucidates the principle motive for nonetheless permitting the punish-
ment of spies captured in-wartime:
The foregoing Article 29 [of the Hague Regula-
tions (Par. 75)] and Article 24 (of the Hague Re-
gulations (Par. 48) (dealing with legitimate uses
of war)], tacitly recognize the well- established
right of belligerents to employ spies and other
secret agents for obtaining information on the
enemy. Resort to that practice involves no offense
against international law. Spies are punished, not
as violators of the laws of war, but to render that
method of obtaining information as dangerous, diffi-
execution or lengthy imprisonment,51 which can be levied on him if he
is captured before returning to his own forces, it does not qualify as
a violation of the laws of war by the sending state. On the contrary,
in the context of wartime, belligerents are entitled to obtain informa-
tion on one another's capabilities and intentions by means of spies and
other legitimate ruses of war.5 2
cult and ineffective as possible.
U*.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM 27-10) on the Law of Land
Warfare (1956), at 32-33, quoted in M. Whiteman, id. at 179. As Wright
observes:
The legitimacy of espionage in time of war arises
from the absence of any general obligation of belli-
gerents to respect the territory or government of the
enemy state, and from the lack of any specific conven-
tion against it. The deception involved resembles that
In stratagems or ruses de Ruerre and differs from vio-
lations of specific conventions like those of the flag
of truce, Red Cross emblems, and armistices, all of
which constitute 'perfidy' and are forbidden by the
law of war.
Wright, "Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Af-
fairs," in Essays on Espionage and International Law 12 (R. Stanger, ed.,
1962).
51See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the authority of a military commission to try eight persons
for espionage who were accused of being Nazi agents intending to commit
sabotage against American industrial plants. The military commission
sentenced six of the eight to death and the others to confinement at
hard labor for extended periods.
52Article 24, Hague Regulations annexed to the Hague ConveP,{on No.
IV of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, Treaty Series No. 539; reprinted in 2 Am. J.
Int'l L. Supp. 97 (1908). Some examples include the following: "Among
legitimate ruses may be countdd surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks,
retreats, or flights, simulating qu!et and inactivity, use of small for-
ces to simulate large units, transmitting false or misleadin, radio or
telephone messages, deception of the enemy by bogus orders purporting
to have bcen issued by the enemy commander, making use of thb enemy's
The inadequacy of the traditional perspective in differentiating
between lawful and unlawful intelligence gathering is evident from this
attempt to base such a distinction on the purported absence of obliga-
tions of belligerents to respect each other's territory or govern-ment.
Nation-states do have certain obligations toward one another even when
engaged in hostilities against each other, based on expectations of re-
ciprocity and retaliation, if not also on considerations of human digni-
ty. The use of certain types of weapons, such as chemical and biologi-
cal agents, and the refusal to take and care for prisoners, are examples
of a variety of policies which most participants refuse to adopt even
when engaged in hostilities. The refusal to employ such measures re-
flects a realization at least of the possibility that an opponent might,
if confronted with the use of such measures, utilize them himself.
Using a more comprehensive perspective than the notion of a lack
of respect for a belligerent's territory or government or the absence
of a specific international convention, the legality or illegality of
wartime, as well as peacetime, intelligence gathering may be ascertained
by analysis of the context in which it occurs and the manner in which it
Is undertaken, particularly in light of the goals and the expectations
of the participants who engage in it. In a wartime context, a belli-
gerent seeks to achieve its objectives, especially the defeat of its
opponent's military forces, by a variety of strategies and tactics.
The use of the military instrument is, of course, central to the accom-
plishment of these objectives. In order to provide for the effective
utilization of this instrument, sound intelligence is required concern-
ing an opponent's capabilities and intentions. Spying, as a means of
obtaining such information, is therefore an important element of any
belligerent's total effort.53
signals and passwords, pretending to communicate with troops or rein-
forcements which have no existence, deceptive supply movements, deli-
berate planting of false information, use of spies and secret agents,
moving landmarks, putting up dummy guns and vehicles or laying dummy
mines, erection of dummy installations and airfields, removing unit
identifications from uniforms, use of signal deceptive measures, and
psychological warfare activities." Para. 51, U.S. Department of the
Army Field Manual UK4 27-10) on the Law of Land Warfare (1956), 22-
23; quoted in Whiteman, op. cit., at 381-382. However, some prohibi-
ted ruses include: ". . . [Making] improper use of a flag of truce,
of the national flag, or of the military isignia and uniform of the
enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Conventions."
Article 23, Par. F, Hague Regulations, Supra.
53As Falk indicates, ". . belligerent espionage is just one of
•severai constituent forms of belligerency. It expresses a logistic
means-end relationship to characteristic belligerent objectives." Falk,
This is not to imply that all methods which serve a belligerent'a
objectives are therefore legitimate. The shooting or mistreatment of
prisoners of war, the use of force significantly greater than necessary
to achieve the objectives sought, the misuse of commonly accepted sym-
bols of neutrals and non-belligerents--these and a variety of other mea-
sures, whether specifically prohibited by international convention or not-
are generally regarded as unlawful, both as contrary to human dignity
and as likely to result in reciprocal use and possible retaliation. Ra-
ther, it is to recognize the indispensable interest of belligerents in
obtaining information on one another, an interest which, if satisfied
may prevent senseless hostilities or, alternatively, hasten their ter-
mination.
The performance of the security intelligence function in a peace-
time context presents more complex, although not entirely dissimilar,
questions of legality. The term "peacetime", however, must be used in
such manner to reflect the realities of the interactions of the partici-
pants to which it is applied. Thus, use of the term "peacetime" to de-
scribe the current world arena must be understood to refer to a desta-
bilized context in which predominantly exclusive perspectives continue
to characterize a variety of activities, including resort to violence.
Nonetheless, there does exist a measure of stability, exemplified by
the mutual, if wary, tolerance of the major participants for one another.
In view of the mutual interest of the major participants, their al-
lies, and the world community as a whole in avoiding a nuclear holocaust,
performance of the security intelligence function is an essential element
in the maintenance by the major participants of an effective second-strike
capability sufficient to deter a first strike with nuclear weapons by an-
other.
"Peacetime" intelligence gathering by the operatives of a nation-
state in the territory of another occupies a hybrid position in the tra-
ditional perspective on international law. Some commentators character-
ize such intelligence gathering as in itself a violation of international
law, based on the notion that it constitutes intervention within the ter-
ritory of another state contrary to the latter's domestic legislation.
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"Foreword", in R. Stanger, supra note 50 at viii; citing Baxter, "So-
Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency'--Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs,"
[1951] Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 322, 329-333. But cf. Draper, "The Status
of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare," (1971], id. 173.
.4See 1rigt, remarks at Panel on "The Pueblo Seizure: Facts, Law,
Policy," in [1969] Proceedings, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 28-30. See also Wright,
"Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 836, 849 (1960).
The predominant traditional perspective, however, regards it as an acti-
vity which does not constitute per se a violation of international law by
the sending state.35 Instead, it is regarded as a practice which is en-
gaged in by all nation-states and yet which gives rise to a right on the
part of the state against whom it is directed to punish the sp for vio-
lating authoritative domestic prescriptions against espionage. 6
Governments whose spies are captured normally refuse to acknowledge
any responsibility for sending them to avoid creating pressure on the
state against whom the spy was directed to seek redress against the send-
ing state.57 As all participants engage in intelligence gathering with
respect to one another, attempts at redress usually serve only to exacer-
bate already existing tensions and further attenuate intelligence gather-
ing opportunities. In the absence of an effective institutionalized sys-
tem of sharing security intelligence among participants, "reciprocally
But ef. Note, "Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer
Space," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1074, n. 1 (1961).
55See 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 862 (8th edn., Lauterpacht,
1955); Beresford, "Surveillance Aircraft atud Satellites: A Problem of
International Law," 27 J. Air L. & Com. 107, 113-114 (1960); 2 Oppenheim.
International Law 422 (7th edn., Lauterpacbt, 1952); Baxter, supra note
53, at 329; Cohen, "Espionage and Immunity--Some Reccnt Problems and De-
velopments," 1948 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 404, 408. See also statemeLZ by
the Polish Representative, Michalowski, during the U-2 incident debate
by the Security Council that "[I]nternational law has never concerned
*itself with peacetime espionage." U.N. Doc. S/PV 858, cited in Note,
supra note 54, at 1074, n. 1. Falk makes an unusual analogy to the sta-
tus of espionage in the traditional system of international law: "This
odd status, which is like that of prostitution in many European countries,
has encouraged a practice whereby states engage in espionage but do- not
come forward to defend an agent who is caught by the techniques of coun-
terespionage." Falk, "Space Espionage and World Order: A Consideration
of the Samos-Midas Program," in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at 57.
561 Oppenhaim, srura note 55, at 862.
5 7Stone observes in this regard:
The disowner of the spy is (as it were) a way of fore-
stalling the discomfort of negotiations which could
in any case only be fruitless; the practice of dis-
owner, therefore, may have no particular significance
in determining what the law is.
tolerated espionage" is essential if at least the major participants
are to maintain retaliatory capabilities sufficient to deter the out-
break of nuclear or other major warfare.5 8
A variant on the traditional perspective shifts the focus from the
legality of the performance in "peacetime" of the security intelligence
function in the territory of another state to the legality of any col-
lateral activities which may accompany it.59 While this might be useful
where performance of the security intelligence function is "increasingly
part of the pattern of coercion roughly identified as 'indirect aggres-
sion,'60 as exemplified by the Nazi use of fifth columns prior to and
during World War II and the Soviet employment of subversive techniques
in Czechoslavakia in 1948,61 it does not offer much assistance in the
Contraril9, . . . if peacetime espionage as such
really did involve state delinquency, it would be a
most surprising thing that aggr!cved states, when there
was such a delinquency, should apparently have allowed
the sending state to acquire immunity from its conse-
quences merely hy making a disowner.
Stone, "Legal Problems of Espionage in Modern Conditions of Conflict,"
in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at 39-40.
58As Stone notes, in the absence of an effective system of ititerna-
tional inspection and the unlikelihood of developing such a system, "You
may not be able to fulfill it [the need which such a system would serve]
to the optimum extent by reciprocally tolerated espionage, but you may
be able to reduce the dangers. It is not certain that you can, but the
possibility surely is worth exploring." Id. at 41.
59
"[The question] is whether, apart from collateral illegality--
there being for example no territorial intrusion when you [are] in outer
space-espionage is a delinquency of the state which engages in it ...
(A]s the law now stands, there is no sufficient warrant for saying that
international law does not permit state-authorized espionage in peace-
time." Id. at 34.
60falk, "Space Espionage and World Order: A Consideration of the
Samos-Midas Program," in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at 80, n. 28.
Falk, "Foreword,' in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at vii. Such co-
vert operations have not been limited to such nation-states as Nazi Ger-
many and the Soviet Union. A number of participants in the world social
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case of the more common forms of gathering security intelligence in the
territory of other states. The latter usually involve attempts merely
to obtain information on the capabilities and intentions of potential




A more useful apprcoch in determining the lawfulness of any parti-
cular instance involving the performance of the security intelligence
function in the territory of another state is one which adopts a more
comprehensive framework of analysis, balancing both inclusive and exclu-
sive interests in minimu= public order with optimum public order interests
in individual dignity and privacy.
6 3
Past and current trends indicate the development of new international
prescriptions governing the "peacetime" exercise of the security intelli-
process have engaged in such activities, including the United States,
as evidenced by the successful coup d'etat staged by the Central In-
telligence Agency in Guatemala in 1954 and by the unsaccessful refu-
gee invasion of Cuba sponsored by the C.I.A. in 1961. D. Wise and T.
Ross, The Invisible Government 136-146, 165-183 (1964);-A. Tully, C.I.A.--
The Inside Story 73-87, 243-256 (1962). Indonesia carried out covert
operations, mainly involving sabotage, against Malaysian governmental
and industrial facilities during their period of confrontation. Brown,
"The Story of a Master Spy," The Canberra Times, July 3, 4, 1964; re-
printed by .the Federal Department of Information, Malaysia (1964).
62The information-collection type of intelligence gathering rarely
qualifies as "intervention," strictly defined, since "ground spies or-
dinarily have entered the victim state legally, and it is hard to con-
strue their acts, however criminal, as violations of the sovereignty
of the territorial integrity of states." Note, supra note 54, at 1101,
n. 144. A broader conception of intervention, as suggested by Wright
("dictatorial interference"), would thus be required under a traditional
perspective if it were to encompass this type of Lntelligence gathering.
See Wright, "Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-tntervention in Internal
Affairs," in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at 4.
63As McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman indicate:
. . . [T]he gathering of intelligence within the
territorial confines of another state is not, in and
of itself, contrary to international law unless it
contravenes policies of the world constitutive pro-
cess affording support to protected features of in-
gence function by a participant in the territory of another. Support
for such a finding is demonstrated, first, by the very few formal pro-
tests by states over the performance of the security intelligence func-
tion in their territory by the operatives of other states, in contrast
with the large number of such incidents which jiave become a matter of
public record. Furthermore, states have become increasingly more can-
did in acknowledging their sponsorship of specific intelligence gather-
Ing activities undertaken by their operatives with respect to other
participants in the international arena.64 These acknouledgements
often include the sponsoring state recovering its intelligence agents
captured by another participant which it holds.65 Such exchanges con-
ternal public order. Activities which seriously com-
promise the dignity of individual citizens, their pri-
vacy or personal security, or involve the destruction
of property are, of course, unlawful no matter which
decision function they attend.
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The Intelligence Function and World Pub-
lic Order," supra note 8, at 395.
64The United States acknowledgment of Its role in sending U-2 pho-
tographic reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960
represented an early development in this direction. See President Eisen-
hower's Report to the Nation, May 25, 1960, and Secretary Herter's Re-
port to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 27, 1960, U.S. Dept.
State Publication 7010, General Foreign Policy Series 151 (1960). As
Falk observes, "The United States broke the old rules of the game by
explicitly defending its recourse to espionage. . . ." Falk, "Forward",
in R. Stanger, supra note 50, at vii. The Soviet Union has acknowledged
the security intelligence function which Col. Rudolph Abel of the K.G.B.
performed in the United States. L. Bernikow, Abel 288-291 (1970).
65The most famous recent example was the exchange on February 10,
1962, of the Soviet agent Col. Rudolph Abel by the United States for
the American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, held by the Soviet Union.
It also involved the release of Frederic Pryor, an American student held
by the East Germans since August 25, 1961, for "economic espionage".
Bernikow, supra note 64, at 283. Sanche de Gramont adds that one in-
strumental in bringing about this exchange was an American lawyer, James
B. Donovan. S. de Gramont, The Secret War-The Story of International
Espionage Since World War II 5D2-504 (1962). Donovan was also involved
in another exchange: the release by the Cuban Government during Decem-
ber 1962, of captured members of the unsuccessful Cuban refugee invasion
stitute at least tacit admission by participants that they do in fact
sponsor and engage in the performance of the security intelligence func-
force, Brigade 2056, in exchange for medicinal supplies and baby foods.
In addition, as Wise and Ross observe:
[Iln March and April of 1963, Donovan won the release
of more than thirty Americans held in Cuban jails, in-
cluding three C.I.A. men. On July 3, when the last of
the medical supplies reached Cuba, the American Red
Cross announced that a total of 9,703 persons (inclu-
ding the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the Americans) had
been brought out of Cuba under the agreements nego-
tiated by Donovan. . .. In all of these missions,
Donovan hait the assistance of, and worked hand in hand
with the United States Government. But he was not for-
mally a part of it. In each case (in the Cuban refugee
case and the Abel-Powers exchange], as a private citi-
zen, he was breaking new ground in a form of intelli-
gence diplomacy that is a unique outgrowth of the Cold
War.
Wise and Ross, sura note 61 at 288.
The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have carried out several
exchanges of their respective intelligence gathering operatixes. Gor-
don Lonsdale, convicted by the British for espionage involving the Un-
derwater Weapons Establishment, was exchanged for Grenville Wynne, an
English businessman sentenced to eight years' imprisonment by the So-
viet Union in 1963. The Soviet Union charged Wynne with acting as a
courier for Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, who was himself convicted of espio-
nage by the Soviet Union. R. West, The New Meaning of Treason 290.!)
(1964). Another British-Russian exchange involved the Soviet agents
.Peter and Helen Kroger (alias Morris and Lona Cohen), convicted of es-
pionage by the United Kingdom, for the British citizen Gerald Brooke,
held by the Soveit Union. A. Terry, "Spy Refuses to go Home", Wash.
Post, Nov. 10, 1969, at A-25:1.
Another recent exchange involved two accused Soviet agents, Ivan
D. Egorov, a personnel officer at the United Nations, and Aleksandra,
his vife, for Marvin Makinen, accused by the Soviet Union of taking
photographs of military installations in Kiev and who the Russians
alleged confessed to engaging in espionage, and Rev. Walter Ciszek, a
Jesuit priest confined for twenty-three years by the Soviet Union.
Wise and Ross, supra note 6 at 241n.
tion in the territory of other states, and perhaps evidence a greater
tolerance on their part for such activities.66
There is also growing recognition67 and tolerance for the perfor-
mance of the security intelligence function by diplomatic representatives
stationed in foreign states. While such tolerance is not uniform among
all participants in the international arena,68 and remains low, if at
all in situations of intense crisis, it is nonetheless perceptible.
69
The Soviet Union also attempted, unsuccessfully, to exchange a group
of West Germans accused of espionage and held in Moscow, for Heinz Suet-
terlin, arrested on similar charges by the West Germans. Terry reports
that the Rissians sent Wolfgang Vogel, an East German private lawyer, to
Bonn to negotiate the exchange. Vogel also was instrumental in negotia-
ting the exchange of the Krogers, convicted by the British of espionage,
for the British lecturer, Brooke. Terry, supra at A-25:1.
66As de Gramont observes with respect to the Abels-Powers exchange,
"the principle implicitly recognized by Premier Krush6hev and Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy ras that espionage is an organic branch of foreign
relations and foreign policy, similar to diplomatic exchanges and summit
conferences". Be Gramont, supra note 65 at 504.
67,"The theory that service attaches or other members of embassies,
legations, or trade commissions do not spy, a theory strengthened by
actual practice at certain periods, for example immediately before 1914,
was one of those polite fictions by which diplomacy had been carried on
In the past. It was finally torn to shreds by the spy trials which vari-
ous Soviet satellite governmentb instituted, and which were in most cases
ntended to compromise foreign service attaches." A. Vagts, The Military
Attache 236-237 (1967).
68
Even among traditionally tolerant participants, such as the Uni-
ted Kingdom, it is not unlimited. On September 24, 1971, the British
governnent expelled ninety persons attached to various Soviet diplomatic
and trade missions in England and denied re-entry to fiftecen more absent
from Britain at the time. The British note to the Soviet government on
this subject stated that "the scale of intelligence-gathering activities
by Soviet officials in this country" has amount to be "a direct threat
to the security of this country. . . ." in"Texts of British Note to So-
viet on Spying and of Home Letters", N. Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1971, at 2:
304.
69For illustrative cases, see Vagtu, supra note 67, at 238-239,
quoting N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1955, on the presence of Soviet and other
attaches at U.S. Amy maneuvers in Louisiana.
Further evidence of this trend in channng international perspec-
tives is presented by President Eisenhozer's proposal, made at the 1955
Geneva summit conference, for an "open skies" policy. This proposal pro-
vided for an exchange of military blueprints between the United States
and the Soviet Union and for the establishment of reciprocal facilities
and opportunities for aerial reconnaissance by each within the territoiy
and airspace of the other. 70 Whlile the Soviet Union did not accept the
proposal as presented, wanting it cmbined with measures directed at
geueral disarmament and made applicable to allieb of each of the tvc
nations as well,71 vthe 'open skies' policy appears to be an unequivo-
cal international prescription." '7 2
Another indiration of the development of new international perspec-
tives on the gathering of security intelligence by participants in the
territory of other states is presented by the practice of certain par-
ticipants in not imposing the most severe penalties allowed by their
statutes on captured intelligence agents of other participants.73 This
70President Eisenhower, Statement on Disarmament, July 21, 1955,
Meeting of Heads of Government at Geneva, July 18023, 1955, 33 Dept.
State Bull. 174 (1955).
71N. Bulganin, Letter to President Eisenhower, Sept. 19, 1955, 33
Dept. State Bull. 644-645 (1955).
7 2cDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process
of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed. 253, 419 (1967); but see
Wright, supra note 62, at 3.
3The West Germans imposed only a three-year term of imprisornment
on a colleague of Heinz Suetterlin, the accused Soviet agent who refused
to be part of an exchange of intelligence gathering operatives. Terry,
supra note 65, at A-25:1. Powers received less than the maximum sentence
("ten years deprivation of freedom, of which the first three years were
to be in prison," and the remainder "served in a corrective labor camp"
or paroled after serving one-half the sentence or corzuted on a showing
of good behavior), in part because of his "sincere confession of his
guilt and his sincere repentence". The Trial of the U-2, The Court Pro-
ceedings of the Case of Francis Gary Powers, heard before the filitary
Division of the Supreme Court ef the U.S.S.R., August 17-19, 1960 (11.
Berman, intro.) XXVI, 158 (1960).
may reflect, at least to a certain extent, a recognition by states of
the importance of the performance of the security intelligence function
to all participants, especially the major ones, in the international
arena.74
However, this practice does not yet appear to extend in all instan-
ces to captured intelligence agents of other participants who also quali-
fy as "traitors". McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 72, at 419.
On treason and espionage, see West, sunra noce65, at 362. Vagts obser-
ves, in regard to the case involving the Swedish Air Force officer, Col.
Sig Wennerstrom, an agent for the Soviet Union while serving, at among
other posts, as senior service attache in Washington from 1952 to 1957,
that Swedish officials "prosecuted him for 'gross espionage', for having
sold the secrets of Sweden and of friendly powers to Russia for some fif-
teen years--and 'for financial gains', as the prosecutor stressed, much
as if ideological motivation would have been less despicable." Vagts,
supra note 67 at 240-241.
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"(G]eneral community perspectives toward the gathering of in-
telligence have undergone far-reaching changes. Contemporary elite
decision-makers have evidently decided that maximum knowledge of ac-
tivities is fundamental to common security.' McDougal, Lasswell &
Reisman, supra note 72, at 419.
As Lasswell observes elsewhere:
"Even after allowance has been made for the double-
dealing so common among intelligence agents, it must
be conceded that competent espionage is a tranquilizing
factor in the prevailing state of global anarchy. We
[the United States] are too strong to be immediately
endangered by anything short of an unforeseen techni-
cal advance which is put into effective application
before we have had time to evolve countermeasures.
Espionage can provide a substratum of realistic
knowledge about the power position and the power
potentials of the nations of the world."
H. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom 88 (1950).
The continued application by nation-states of their statutes and
policies against the performance of the security intelligence function
I their territory by the operatives of other states should not be per-
mitted to conceal this fundamental shift in perspective. The elites
of nation-states employ such statutes, which are usually phrased in
terms of prescribing unauthorized disclosure of information relating to
militzry capabilities and intentions,75 to protect their bases of effec-
tive power. While these statutes continue to be applied and often make
excessive demands on a citizen's loyalty, national elites have mitiga-
ted their impact in a number of cases involving captured intelligence
agents of other participants, either by engaging in exchanges with such
participants for their own operatives, or in simply imposing sentences
less than the maximal provided under their statutes.
The all-encompassing nature of gathering and sharing intelligence
for security purposes, which often include such seemingly innocuous ac-
tivities as attendance at the meetings of international associations
and observations made and reported while travelling abroad as a tourist,
suggests that national statutes directed against the performance of the
security intelligence function be narrowly construed, to cover only
those activities clearly hostile to the maintenance by a national elite
of its position of effective power. Such statutes should not encompass-
all the varied activities which qualify as performance of the security
intelligence function, as this would constrict the liberties of those
affected while in most instances providing only a small additional in-
crement of protection for an elite's effective power position.7 6 If
* 75See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a), "Gathering or Delivering De-
fense Information to Aid Foreign Government" (1954).
76A permissible scope for such statutes has been suggested by the
following:
Experience appears to support the conclusion that
the security of a nation depends to a very small de-
gree upon police measures designed to keep knowledge
away from the enemy. Modern business has learned to
depend less on the protection of patent and copy-
right privileges than upon keeping a few jumps ahead
of competition by excelling on the laboratory front.
In general, it is agreed that proper censorship
and police measures are needed to protect the follow-
Ing:
applied indiscriminately, they could serve to convert siztable areas of




The security intelligence function is characterized by a policy of
open access when performed on the high seas and in the airspace above
and outer space, and an increasingly open environment when performed
in the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Although nation-states
have not repealed their statutes or otherwise abandoned their policies
against the performance of the security intelligence function within
their national territory by operatives of another state, thcre is evi-
dence of increasing recognition on their part of the significance to
their collective security of greater sharing of security intelligence
and of opportunities to gather such information. Support for such a
trend is found in the practice of nations exchanging their intelligence
gathering operatives held by one another, levying less than maximal sen-
tence~on captured operatives of another, and acknowledging their spon-
sorship of intelligence gathering activities within the territory of
other states.
insofar, then, as states apply their policies directed at maintain-
ing their position of effective powar and supporting preferred public
order goals such as individual privacy, such policies need not conflict
unduly with policies favoring the gathering and sharing of security in-
telligence. What is required in each instance is a thorough assessment
of the elements involved and the context in which they arise in order
to achieve a balance which accommodates both sets of interests.
-technical details of new weapons
--technology by which new weapons are manufactured
--identity of the resources, facilities, and man-
power going into new weapons, and amounts in-
volved
--information that specific surprise weapons are
being worked on
-specific plans of armed defense
-precise news of the pzogress of treaty and agree-
ment negotiations (when the parties so desire)
--identity of secret friends abroad
--identity of our counteragents
--information concerning allies of the categories
that we protect in our own case.
Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, supra note 74 at 88-
89 (footnote omitted).
77Lasswell & Kaplan, supra note 1 at 213.
